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Abstract
This paper proposes a two-dimensional Strategic Performance Measure (SPM) to evaluate the achievement of
sustained superior performance.  This proposal builds primarily on the fact that, under the strategic management
perspective, a firm's prevalent objective is the pursuit of sustained superior performance.  Three basic
conceptual dimensions stem from this objective: relativity, sign dependence, and dynamism.  These are the
foundations of the SPM, which carries out a separate evaluation of the attained superior performance and of its
sustainability over time.  In contrast to existing measures of performance, the SPM provides: (i) a dynamic
approach by considering the progress or regress in performance over time, and (ii) a cardinal measurement of
performance differences and its changes over time.  The paper also proposes an axiomatic framework that a
measure of strategic performance should comply with to be theoretically and managerially sound. Finally, an
empirical illustration of the Spanish banking sector during 1987-1999 is herein provided by discussing some
relevant cases.
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21. Introduction
Strategic management research focuses on explaining the heterogeneity of performance
among firms. Performance evaluation uncovers such differences, addresses their
measurement, and analysis.  It provides a valuation of the outcome results attained by
economic agents, in our case firms, which discriminates between success and failure in
performance, and establishes the degree to which the former or the latter has been achieved.
The importance of performance evaluation arises from the many consequences that
successful or unsuccessful results can have in economic agents, not the least of which is the
survival prospects of the organization, or the possibility to sustain a certain welfare situation.
Furthermore, performance evaluation assesses the degree of success of the actions or
strategies implemented, which will allow improvement in future decisions.
Evaluating the performance of a firm implies the synthesis of the performance data available
for a firm, which necessitates the use of measures or methods in charge of carrying out this
synthesis.   This aggregation aims to convey the relevant information about performance,
therefore it has to consider how the judgements over performance results are made, thus
reflecting the preferences of evaluators on results, in order to be theoretically and
managerially sound. Therefore, information about the preferences of evaluators is required.
Although preferences can vary across individuals, evaluators taking a strategic management
point of view have reached a consensus on a firm's prevalent preference or objective: this is
attaining superior economic performance to that of competitors (Rumelt, Schendel and Teece,
1994), assuming that it is the reward for having competitive advantages (e.g. Barney, 1997,
Grant, 1998), which firms must achieve and sustain.
The concept of competitive advantage dates back to Ansoff (1965) and was widely
popularized by Porter (1979, 1980).  A competitive advantage was to be the source of
superior performance for firms, as it provided a strong competitive position (Ansoff, 1965:
110).  Later, literature became more demanding requiring the sustainability of superior
performance (Porter, 1985; Ghemawat, 1986; Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991; Amit and
Shoemaker, 1993; Porter, 1996).  This expansion of the concept includes a dynamic and
strategic point of view, accepting that only some competitive advantages are difficult to
imitate by competitors in the long run and, therefore, can lead to a sustained superior
performance over time.  Assuming this upgraded objective for firms, this paper proposes a
3two-dimensional Strategic Performance Measure (SPM) to gauge sustained superior
performance by carrying out a double evaluation: (i) the degree to which superior
performance is obtained, as a result of achieving competitive advantages, and (ii) the
sustainability of this superior performance.  In this way, the SPM will report on the degree of
achievement of Sustained Superior Performance (State 1).  Otherwise, if this state has not
been reached, the SPM will classify the performance of the firm into three other possible
states: Eroding Superior Performance (State 2), Worsening Inferior Performance (State 3),
and Reducing Inferior Performance (State 4).  The definition of the four states is relevant as
they all do take place.    For example, the classic works of Mueller (1986, 1990) especially
highlight the finding of firms whose performance would be classified in State 1, State 2, and
State 4.
Apart from presenting a new measure of strategic performance, this paper proposes a set of
axiomatic properties which we believe should be held for other measures of strategic
performance. These properties are based on three basic conceptual dimensions called:
relativity, sign dependence and dynamism.  These dimensions, in turn, stem from the
objective of pursuing sustained superior performance.
This paper proceeds as follows: the following section presents the background literature on
the persistence of superior performance.  The third section begins with the derivation of the
three basic conceptual dimensions: relativity, sign dependence, and dynamism.  It continues
with the definition of the Strategic Performance Measure and its two components, and the
analysis of the states of sustained superior performance and the three other possible states.  It
also sets out a graphic analysis of this definition, which enables the temporal analysis of
superior performance and its sustainability.  The theoretical evaluation of the two measures is
presented in section four.  An illustration of the proposed measures is given in section five,
and a final section of conclusions ends the paper.
2. Background on Strategic Performance Evaluation
The rationale for sustained superior performance is the possession of sustained competitive
advantages. Therefore, the main task for managers is to find strategies that create, renew, and
struggle to maintain competitive advantages, even in hypercompetitive contexts (D'Aveni,
1994).  For this reason, literature has mainly focused on competitive advantage as the
4dependent variable, i.e., in explaining the sources of sustained competitive advantage.  As
Wiggins and Ruefli (2002) point out, only a few studies have concentrated on the distribution
of performance, or what they call the topography of performance.
Studies of the distribution of performance are found in two literature sources: the first one is
the literature on the persistence of profits, which has generally used time series
methodologies, and is mainly found close to the domain of industrial organization; the second
source of literature that we believe to be related to strategic performance is the one in ex post
risk measurement.  This branch of literature is relevant because it is concerned with what
economic agents (e.g., firms, managers, investors) are averse to, which is necessarily related
to some type of failure in performance, and failure is part of the strategic performance
concern.  Secondly, it must be noted that an important part of the literature on risk has an ex
post focus, which means that it is actually carrying out an evaluation of realized outcomes.
For example, the recent works of Miller and Reuer (1996), Miller and Leiblin (1996), Miller
and Bromiley (1996), Ruefli, Collins and LaCugna (1999), and Reuer and Leiblin (2000) run
mainly along the lines of ex post risk measurement.  Another interesting feature of this body
of research is that it is measure-oriented, which involves the development and evaluation of
measures that synthesize ex ante or ex post performance.
Time series approaches
The main body of research on superior performance has been based on autoregressive time
series methodologies.  These methods were selected because the aim of this part of the
literature was to study the dynamism of performance, namely the persistence or decay in
performance.  Mueller (1986, 1990) used this methodology with the purpose of examining
the long-term persistence of superior ROA for large US industrial firms, mainly finding the
convergence of performance towards the mean, although at a slower speed for the highest-
performing firms, and some high-performing firms whose ROA increased over time.  The
same type of autoregressive methods were used in studies for other US and European firms or
strategic business units, with similar findings (e.g. Geroski and Jacquemin, 1988; Jacobsen,
1988; Schohl, 1990; Droucopoulus and Lianos, 1993; Goddard and Wilson, 1996; Waring,
1996).  More recently, Mueller and Raunig (1999) used the same autoregressive model
developed in Mueller (1986) and Geroski (1990) to test whether the results from Structure-
Conduct-Performance models estimated at the industry level are sensitive to the degree of
heterogeneity of the firms in industries. Consistent with Mueller (1986) for the US over the
5period 1950-1972, and Mueller (1990) for six other countries, his findings indicate that
competitive forces require more than one year to eliminate short-term rents; that persistent
differences in performance across firms exist within many industries; that it cannot be
assumed that profits observed in an industry at a given point in time are near their long-term
equilibrium which, in turn, is not the same for all industries; and that inter-, and within-
industry variations in profit rates are important in many cases.  Therefore, the existence and
persistence of profit differences is still an issue because the empirical findings encounter
room for delays or violations of the expected decay in abnormal profits that the economic
theory predicts.
In the field of strategic management, Wiggins and Ruefli (2002) have recently made a
contribution to the measurement of persistent superior performance.  They use a new
methodology introduced in Ruefli and Wiggins (2000) to stratify firms in groups of
performance, and they investigate the stability over time of pertaining to the higher
performance group by means of ordinal time series methods.
Measure-oriented approach
Many of the models and measures used to evaluate ex post risk have been borrowed from
financial economics and statistical decision theory.  The most traditional approach is the
mean-variance model, which presents the mean as a measure of the central tendency of
outcomes and the variance as a measure of its variability.  The mean is widely accepted as a
valuable description of a series of outcomes, but there is more discussion on the use of the
variance, which is often presented as a measure of risk.  Alternative approaches have
abandoned variance to complement the mean with other measures aimed at considering what
decision-makers perceive as risk, such as semi-variance, deviations below a target level or
some derivative of a covariance, like the beta of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (Malkiel,
1989).  However, strategy research has recently identified that reliance on these existing
measures of risk may not be adequate for both the concept and the use in management
research (e.g., Bettis and Thomas, 1990; Baird and Thomas, 1990; Miller and Leiblin, 1996;
Ruefli, Collins and LaCugna, 1999).
It can be considered that, the mean being a measure of the central tendency of a series of
performance outcomes of a firm, a measure to complement it, namely ex post risk measure,
should convey the information of outcomes which is relevant and not related to centrality.  In
6our opinion, this should be the temporal dynamics of performance.  The dynamic dimension
has not been dealt with in literature on ex post risk which has largely had a static approach.
Only some exceptions on ex post risk literature have developed measures which consider
dynamism in a measure-oriented approach (Collins and Ruefli, 1992; Fiegenbaum and
Thomas, 1990).1
This paper proposes to integrate the synthesis provided by the measure-oriented approaches
and the concerns for dynamism underlying the time series approach by putting forward a two-
dimensional Strategic Performance Measure (SPM).  The first component of SPM, which we
have named Static Performance, will provide a cardinal evaluation of the superior (or
inferior) performance attained by a firm.  The second component of SPM, named Dynamic
Performance, will provide a measurement of the sustainability (or erosion) of performance
over time.  In this way, the SPM will give information on the dynamism of performance,
similar to a time series approach, but it further provides an explicit cardinal measurement of
superior performance and its dynamic evolution.
3. The Strategic Performance Measure
3.1 Three basic dimensions in strategic performance evaluation
The aim of performance evaluation consists of judgement on the outcome results obtained by
firms, in order to discriminate between success and failure in performance, and establishing
the degree to which the former or the latter has been achieved. Success will be achieved when
the preferences or objectives of evaluators are fulfilled.  Thus, under a strategic management
perspective, success is defined by achieving persistent superior economic performance to that
of competitors, assuming that it arises from sustainable competitive advantages.
Superior performance can be understood in different ways. Economic theory views it as
abnormal profits or rents, with respect to those predicted by equilibrium models.  But when
an equilibrium state does not apply, they allow firm-specifics rents, which are those in excess
of the competitive return and an industry return, as is done in relevant research under the
industrial organization perspective (e.g. Waring, 1996).  Nevertheless, a more strategic
concept, coherent with the strategic management postulates, understands superior
performance of a firm as outperforming its industry (Besanko, Dranove and Shanley, 1996).2
Empirical works in the field of industrial organization operationalize this superiority as the
7return in excess of the average of the sector, industry or system investigated (e.g., Mueller,
1986; Mueller, 1990; Geroski and Jacquemin, 1988; Mueller and Raunig, 1999; Goddard and
Wilson, 1996).  In the field of strategic management, the recent work of Wiggins and Ruefli
(2002) defines superior performance as statistically significant, above-average performance
with respect to the industry.
The definition of sustained superior performance is subject to more ambiguity.  From the
definition for sustained competitive advantage due to Barney (1991), sustained superior
performance would be that which continues to exist after competitors have made efforts to
reproduce the underlying competitive advantage that leads to the superior performance.
Porter (1985) provides a more feasible definition by associating sustained competitive
advantage with long-term profitability or above-average performance in the long run.
Assuming that the prevalent objective is pursuing sustainable superior performance, the paper
infers three basic conceptual dimensions that should be an integral part in the assessment of
strategic performance: relativity, sign dependence, and dynamism. These are analyzed herein
and contrasted with literature.
Relativity
Relativity arises from judging success as the attaining of targets, thus necessitating the
comparison of realized outcomes with targeted ones in order to discriminate between good
and bad outcomes.  If the objective for firms is to achieve a superior performance, relativity
comes from the very definition.  Superior means greater than the performance of comparable
firms, such as competitors.  If the target is to sustain superior performance, success is
considered as sustaining or improving the privileged position in performance, and failure will
be to suffer an erosion in the relative performance.
The relativity of performance evaluation has been widely considered in literature on the
persistence and dynamics of superior performance.  Mueller (1986, 1990), Mueller and
Raunig (1999) and Goddard and Wilson (1996, 1999) analyze performance at the firm level
by using the firm´s standardized profit, which is the difference between the rate of profit of a
firm and a certain average rate of profit.  Geroski and Jacquemin (1988) operationalize
success as exceeding the average profitability, calculated across all firms of the country
8sample. Waring (1996) refers to firm-specific rents, as the excess return from the competitive
return and an industry rent.
This property has been especially considered in literature concerning the concept and
measurement of risk by introducing the importance of targets, which discriminate successful
outcomes from unsuccessful ones (e.g., March and Shapira, 1987; MacCrimmon and
Wehrung, 1986).  For example, in the field of finance, Mao (1970) finds that managers
perceive risk as the failure to achieve their target returns, in accordance with maximizing the
value of the firm, and consider the growth of returns and their stability as important.  Stone
(1973) calculates risk as deviations from target measures, and downside CAPM measures
also consider targets to discriminate success from failure (e.g., Bawa and Lindenberg, 1977;
Harlow and Rao, 1989).  In the field of behavioral decision theory, Fishburn (1984) considers
risk as a judgement of outcomes according to targets desired and preferences, which means
that risk involves the discrimination between more and less desirable outcomes.  In the field
of strategic management, Aaker and Jacobson (1990) state that risk can be considered as the
probability of loss or the shortfall in achieving a certain return level fixed as the target.
Targets are also relevant in the downside measures proposed for strategic management
(Miller and Leiblin, 1996; Miller and Reuer, 1996; Reuer and Leiblin, 1999).
In conclusion, these pieces of literature on different economic and management fields
consider that success, what evaluators (managers or investors) want, is attaining or exceeding
targets.  Falling short of targets, or failure, is what they do not want.  In consequence, a
conceptually valid measure has to gauge to what degree targets are achieved.
Sign  dependence
This dimension points out that perception makes a distinction between outcomes according to
their position relative to targets, and that valuation should take that into account. It is
precisely the positive or negative sign of the deviation from the target which marks the
distinction between success or failure.  According to sign dependence, achieving and
exceeding targets is positively evaluated and should increase the value of performance
assessment, whereas failing to achieve targets is negatively evaluated and decreases the
performance assessment of the firm.
9Existing literature on the persistence of performance is mainly focused on finding evidence of
superior performance and investigating whether it decays or persists over time.3   As the
focus of study is a truncated part of performance, sign dependence is not covered by this
literature.  Also, as it is not oriented to produce measures of performance, the methods do not
imply a valuation of the results.  On the contrary, sign dependence is explicitly defended in
literature on ex ante performance assessment, such as in the behavioral decision theory (e.g.,
Fishburn, 1982, 1984; Luce and Fishburn, 1991), in the prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), and in the classic expected utility frameworks
used in economic decision theory (e.g., Kreps, 1990).  As for ex post performance measures,
the mean complies with sign dependence, but other widespread measures of performance
violate this property.  For example, measures based on variance make no distinction in the
contribution of outcomes above or below targets, thus failing to comply with sign
dependence. Downside risk measures, such as semi-variance or deviations below target,
propose that outcomes above the target neither add to nor reduce the value of risk.
Dynamic evaluation
The objective of pursuing persistent or sustained superior performance has a long-term
perspective at least.  But we contend that it implies a dynamic perspective in the sense that
success is related to avoiding the erosion of superior performance, that is, to maintaining the
advantage over time or even improving it.  This dimension, therefore, requires considering
the time-ordering of outcomes.
The importance of dynamics has already been recognized in literature.  Actually, existing
literature on the persistence of performance uses a time series methodology, which embodies
the consideration of the time-ordering of the outcomes.  This is not the case for literature on
the measurement of ex post risk (performance) in the field of strategic management, as they
propose aggregations of static performance.  However, there are some worthwhile exceptions
to be mentioned.  Bettis and Mahajan (1990) explicitly consider it in performance evaluation
and propose a time series methodology.  Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990) implicitly consider
this dimension by designing a measure that calculates deviations of returns with respect to an
average of returns for the previous four years.  Collins and Ruefli (1992) propose an ordinal,
dynamic, but not sign-dependent, approach where performance is evaluated by the changes of
a firm's position, over time, within the industry's returns ranking system.
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The three dimensions defended also hold some similarities with the Strategic Reference Point
Theory (Fiegenbaum, Hart and Schendel, 1996).  This theory states that the formulation of
reference points or targets used to evaluate performance have to draw upon three sources of
information: internal capability, external conditions, and time.  Also, the conceptual
dimensions are consistent with two of the analytical steps proposed by Del Sol and
Ghemawat (1999) for the strategic valuation of investments, namely, positioning and
sustainability.
If targets can be assumed to be achieving superior performance, a valid measure must convey
this; if the targets are sustaining a superior performance, a valid measure must determine to
what extent this is achieved.  We contend that these can be attained by defining a measure
which complies with the three aforementioned properties, as defined in the next section.
3.2 Definition of the Strategic Performance Measure (SPM)
The achievement of superior performance implies a double incremental objective for
performance which has to be considered in strategic evaluation.  Firstly, superior
performance is understood as outperforming competitors, as already discussed in the
relativity dimension.  A measure of performance should explain the degree, or lack, of
achievement of this superior performance, in function of the magnitude of the achievement
and its frequency.  This can be measured periodically by comparing the outcomes of an
organization to those of competitors.  This can be considered as a static evaluation because it
measures the achievement of the period-by-period goal.  Secondly, sustainability implicitly
entails the desire of continuous improvement in outcomes, which in turn requires the
dimension of dynamism.  Therefore, a strategic evaluation of performance should consider
both steps, which can be called static and dynamic, respectively. For this reason a two-
dimensional measure is herein proposed, which we call Strategic Performance Measure,
which considers both evaluations separately.  The two components of the Strategic
Performance Measure are: Static Performance, which assesses to what degree superior
performance for a firm is obtained, and Dynamic Performance, assessing the temporal
dynamics of performance. The first two basic conceptual dimensions, relativity and sign
dependence, will be implemented in both measures.  The third dimension, dynamism, will
only be enforced in the dynamic performance measure.
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Let { }iniiit xxxx ,...,, 10=  be the outcomes of a firm i obtained in period t, 0ix  being the initial
performance.  The dimension of relativity can be put into practice by comparing the
outcomes of a firm i at time t, itx , with a reference or target level for the same period, 
ref
tx ,
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generating what in literature has been called performance deviation or discrepancy (e.g.,
Miller and Leiblin, 1996), itδ , as:
 reftitit xx −=δ .
The performance discrepancy is the degree to which the outcomes of firm i have
outperformed the reference level.  The reference level should be a proxy of the level of
performance to outrun, such as the average of the industry or group, the outcome of a
competitor used as a benchmark, or a certain best practice.  If 0>itδ , the firm's performance
is above the target, and if 0<itδ , it is below the target.  The additive aggregation of itδ  over
n periods produces the measure of static performance (SPi), which for discrete historical
outcomes data is defined as follows:5
Definition 1:   Static Performance (SP)
The measure of static performance for a firm i in a period comprised between 1 and n is
the mean value of itδ  from t=1 to n:
( ) ∑
=
=
n
t
iti n
nSP
1
1,1 δ ,
being ( )reftitit xx −=δ .6
If 0>iSP , the firm has achieved a superior performance because its outcomes have been, on
average, above the reference level.  If 0<iSP , the firm has not shown superior performance
because outcomes have been, on average, below reference levels, and if 0=iSP , the firm has
had, on average, the same outcomes as the reference, showing neither an advantage nor a
disadvantage. This measure can have a centrality interpretation as the average static position
of the outcomes of a firm relative to the reference levels, thus evaluating the average superior
or inferior performance achieved.  A similar type of measure is proposed by Miller and
Leiblin (1996), who define a downside risk measure to evaluate ex ante or ex post
performance with a parallel interpretation, but only considering outcomes below the reference
level.
[1]
[2]
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The property of dynamism is meant to reflect the sustainability of superior performance, i.e.,
the maintenance or the erosion of the advantage in performance.  Therefore, the measure
should increase if outcomes positively deviate from the reference levels, i.e., when itδ
increases over time, and should decrease if outcomes negatively deviate from the reference
levels, i.e., when itδ  decreases.  The measure of dynamic performance will be defined to
incorporate this property.
Let itz  be the comparative performance change from period t-1 to period t as:
1−−= itititz δδ .
If  0<itz , the firm has suffered an erosion in its outcomes relative to the reference levels in
this transition from t-1 to t, failing to achieve any objective of sustainability. If 0=itz , the
firm has maintained its position relative to reference levels, whatever it is.  If  0>itz , the
firm has improved its position, meeting its dynamic objective to improve performance over
time.  The aggregation of that behavior over time is carried out in the measure of Dynamic
Performance ( iDP ) which for discrete historical outcomes is defined as follows:
7
Definition 2: Dynamic Performance (DP)
The measure of dynamic performance for a firm i in a period comprised between 1 and n
is the mean value of itz  from t=1 to n:
( ) ∑
=
=
n
t
iti zn
nDP
1
1,1 ,
being 1−−= itititz δδ .8
If 0<iDP , the firm has, on average, suffered an erosion in its outcomes relative to the
reference levels over this time-period, failing to achieve the objective of sustainability.  If
0=iDP , the firm has maintained its position relative to reference levels in the period under
analysis.  If  0>iDP , the firm has, on average, improved its position, meeting its dynamic
objective to increase performance.  Apart from dynamism, iDP  involves the other two
dimensions because it ultimately aggregates on itδ , which complies with relativity and sign
dependence, as can be seen in the expression of itz  as a function of the original performance
outcomes:
[3]
[4]
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The definition of dynamic performance lets the final relative position of outcomes of a firm i,
inδ , to be expressed as a function of the initial position, 0iδ , and the dynamic performance,
as follows:
iiin Dn P 0 += δδ .
In turn, the final outcome value of the firm can be expressed as:
( ) irefrefniin Dnxxxx P  00 +−+= .
As can be seen in expression [7], iDP  offers a simple interpretation and connection with the
actual outcomes.  This is due to its linearity. It is formulated as an average and can be
interpreted as the average periodical rate of change of the relative position, which can be an
increase in the distance to the reference level, when 0>iDP , a decrease when 0<iDP , or
the maintenance of the relative position when 0=iDP .
The two component measures have been defined; however, the strategic evaluation of
performance implies the integration of both evaluations to measure the degree of achievement
of the objective of attaining a sustained superior performance.  For this reason we formulate
the Strategic Performance Measure as follows:
Definition 3: Strategic Performance Measure (SPM)
The Strategic Performance Measure (SPM) is a two-dimensional measure which
evaluates the degree to which a firm has achieved sustained superior performance,
assessing its relative position by means of the measure of Static Performance ( iSP ) and
the temporal dynamics of the relative performance by means of the measure of Dynamic
Performance ( iDP ).
This two-dimensional approach allows the graphic representation and analysis of the
performance of a firm, as is explored in the next section. Additionally, the performance over
a long period of time can be divided into subperiods to introduce the analysis of the
transitions in performance over time.
[6]
[5]
[7]
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3.3. The graphical display of the Strategic Performance Measure
The signs of the two component measures of the SPM define four relevant performance
states.  In the most favorable one 0>iSP  and 0≥iDP , meaning that the firm has achieved,
on average, a superior performance which has been sustained over time, or improved in the
case that 0>iDP .10  In this case strategic performance has undoubtedly been successful.
The extent of such achievement is measured statically by the value of iSP , and the average
dynamic improvement rate is measured by the value of iDP .  The strategic performance of a
firm in that situation would be depicted in State 1 in Figure 1, and it is referred to as
Sustained Superior Performance.  The second best status would take place when 0>iSP  but
0<iDP .  In that case, the firm has, on average, achieved a superior performance measured
by the value of iSP , but it has been eroding over time at the rate indicated by the value of
iDP .  This situation is depicted in State 2, and is named Eroding Superior Performance.
-- Insert Figure 1 around here --
Should the firm be in a disadvantageous performance situation, its state will be in the lower
quadrants, because 0≤iSP .  When the firm reduces the distance to targets, it reduces its
inferior performance, that is, 0≥iDP .  It will be represented in State 4, in the right quadrant,
and it is called Reducing Inferior Performance.  The worst possible situation in strategic
performance is found when a firm has an inferior performance, 0<iSP , which is becoming
worse over time, causing a negative dynamic performance, 0<iDP .  This has been named
Worsening Inferior Performance, and it is represented in State 3 of Figure 1.
The most desirable situation is being in State 1, but there are two other states which can be
considered positively. In a short-term evaluation, firms would be required to have a superior
performance, 0≥iSP , thus being represented in the first row of Figure 1 (States 1 or 2).  But
in a long-term perspective, dynamic performance is what measures whether the progress is
made or not with the aim of building superior performance, therefore increasing the
importance of  being preferably in the second column (States 1 or 4). However, there is one
state which can not be considered good from any point of view: Worsening Inferior
Performance is an undesirable state, in both a short- and a long-term perspective.
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This two-dimensional approach to the measurement of strategic performance has several
interesting features.  In the first place, it defines objective criteria which classify the strategic
performance of a firm into four possible states, considering not only superior performers but
also inferior performers.  Secondly, it distinguishes between the static position (superior or
inferior performance) and the dynamic performance over time (improving or worsening),
which could be assimilated to a short- and a long-run evaluation of performance,
respectively.  Thirdly, apart from the four states analysis, it offers a cardinal analysis, which
is the synthesis of performance into a measure (two-dimensional) which allows the ordering
of strategic performance according to the two dimensions.  This could not be offered by the
other dynamic approaches such as time series analysis and stratification techniques.
Furthermore, the proposed Strategic Performance Measure will be tested to have some
properties that make it conceptually and technically recommendable.
3.4 The transitions within the four states
If the evaluation of strategic performance is carried out over a long time-period, it may well
be worth considering making periodical measurements of the strategic performance achieved.
Next we shall briefly exemplify how this analysis could be useful for strategic management.
-- Insert Figure 2 around here --
According to literature, the performance of a firm can exhibit certain transitions along the
four states of strategic performance.  Figure 2 represents a hypothetical case.  When a firm
has achieved a differentiation advantage (Porter, 1985), it is expected to achieve a superior
performance which will be maintained for a certain time-period, therefore being represented
in SPM 1.  If the advantage attained by the firm is only sustainable over a limited period, it is
expected that the superior performance erodes over time, as imitators reproduce the
advantages or innovators find minor advantages that allow them to catch up in performance.
This occurrence would leave the performance evaluation of the firm in SPM 2.  If the firm
evaluated is not able to come to the market with more innovations in products, processes, or
resources use, but some competitors do, the firm will lose the competitive advantage and
therefore its superior performance.  In this case, it will move away from SPM 2 because its
static performance will be negative.  If innovating competitors succeed in their advantages
and increase performance along a time-period, the strategic performance of the firm under
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analysis will move to SPM 3, where it does not have superior performance and its relative
position even becomes worse over time.  If the firm manages to react to that situation and
place advantageous products into its markets, its performance can gain positions over time,
that is, having a positive dynamic performance, which will bring the firm to SPM 4.  Should
this not happen, the evaluation of the firm would remain in State 3, which is the most
dangerous state.
To sum up, any trajectory that leads to State 3 (Worsening Inferior Performance) should be
considered as extremely dangerous for the survival of the firm.  On the contrary, trajectories
leading to State 1 (Sustained Superior Performance) are the healthiest ones for a firm.  The
multiple observation of performance, in consecutive periods, provides a view of the stability
of strategic performance, answering the questions of the changes of relative position in
performance over time, and of the gain or loss in competitiveness, in performance terms.  It
allows the possibility to confirm several aspects of strategic performance: whether it is stable
over time, whether its relative position is randomly moving from one state to another or not,
whether relative gains and losses are produced over time; or whether a certain trajectory
backed by theory stands or not. Also, it can be used to analyze the effects of the strategic
interaction among firms, because the performance of relevant competitors can be analyzed in
parallel, to evaluate the effects of their competition over time on strategic performance.  In
section 5 an application of the SPM  to the Spanish banking sector is provided to illustrate the
meaning of the measure and to study some relevant cases where different trajectories along
the four states can be observed.
4.  Theoretical Evaluation of a Measure of Strategic Performance
In the previous section the two-dimensional measure of Strategic Performance has been
defined, in terms of its two components: Static Performance and Dynamic Performance.  The
component measures were defined to comply with the three basic dimensions relevant to
performance evaluation: relativity, sign dependence, and dynamism.  In this section the three
basic conceptual dimensions are transformed into an axiomatic framework that we defend
should apply to any measure of strategic performance.  The framework ensures that the
measures make managerial sense and desirable mathematical properties.
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The three basic dimensions, relativity, sign dependence, and dynamism, give rise to six
mathematical properties.  Two other conceptual properties are added to the evaluation system
because they are supported by literature, and are compatible with and complementary to the
previous six ones.  The properties will be listed in turn and applied to the measures of Static
Performance and Dynamic Performance as the components of the SPM.  In the formulation
of the properties, the expression good outcomes refers to those outcomes judged as successful
because they achieve or exceed targets, i.e., the static outcomes which comply with 0>itδ  or
dynamic outcomes which comply with 0≥itz .  Bad outcomes will be the ones judged as
failures in achieving targets, i.e., the static ones with 0≤itδ  or the dynamic ones with
0<itz .
Property 1:  Relativity in value.
The contribution of an outcome to the value of performance assessment depends on the
reference levels, as well as the value of the outcome itself.
Property 2:  Sign dependence.
The marginal contribution of a good (bad) outcome is positive (negative), i.e., it increases
(decreases) the value of the performance measure.
Static evaluation:  If δ ′ is a good (bad) static outcome, then SP(δ + δ') >(<) SP(δ).
Dynamic evaluation:  If z′ is a good (bad) dynamic outcome, then DP(z + z') >(<) DP(z).
Property 3:  Monotonicity in value.
The performance measure is continuous and increases (decreases) with the value of good
(bad) outcomes.
Static evaluation:  If δ is a good (bad) static outcome, then 0/ >∂∂ δSP ( )0/  <∂∂ δSP .
Dynamic evaluation: If z is a good (bad) dynamic outcome, then 0/  >∂∂ zDP  ( )0/ <∂∂ zDP .
Property 4:  Monotonicity in frequency.
The performance measure is continuous and increases (decreases) with the frequency of good
(bad) outcomes.
Static evaluation: If p is the frequency of a good (bad) static outcome, then 0/ >∂∂ pSP
( )0/  <∂∂ pSP .
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Dynamic evaluation: If q is the frequency of a good (bad) dynamic outcome, then
0/  >∂∂ qDP  ( )0/ <∂∂ qDP .
The following two properties only apply to the dynamic performance measure as they are
derived from the dynamic dimension.
Property 5:  Dynamic sign dependence.
If the outcomes of the firm, itx , increase (decrease) over time, the performance measure
increases (decreases), ceteris paribus:  being 1−−=∆ ititit xxx ,  then  0/ >∆∂∂ tixDP .
Property 6:  Dynamic relativity.
If reference level outcomes, reftx , increase (decrease) over time, the performance measure
decreases (increases), ceteris paribus:  being reft
ref
t
ref
t xxx 1−−=∆ ,  then  0/ <∆∂∂ reftxDP .
There are two other conceptual properties which are not derived from the three basic
dimensions but which are found in literature and have also been considered relevant.  The
first one is diminishing sensitivity, which considers that the marginal contribution of
outcomes decreases with its magnitude.  The rationale behind this property is that the
psychological response to change is a concave function of the magnitude of this change.  This
property is proposed by the behavioral decision theory, and especially by the prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).  This property would require
that the measure of performance should be concave for bad outcomes and convex for good
outcomes.  However, this property is not generally accepted.  Widespread measures of ex
post performance, such as the mean and the variance, do not comply with diminishing
sensitivity, and even the variance presents increasing sensitivity.  Because of the advantages
of linearity and some criticisms on diminishing sensitivity, we propose non-increasing
sensitivity.
Property 7:  Non-increasing sensitivity in the value of outcomes.
Static evaluation:  If δ is a good (bad) static outcome, then 0/ 22 ≤∂∂ δSP  ( )0/ 22 ≥∂∂ δSP .
Dynamic evaluation: If z is a good (bad) dynamic outcome, then 0/ 22 ≤∂∂ zDP
( )0/ 22 ≥∂∂ zDP .
19
Another conceptual property affects the reference or target levels, which are the values used
to discriminate between good and bad outcomes.  As already mentioned, valid reference
levels must be relevant for the competitive arena of the firm or group under analysis.  In
strategic management literature, applications tend to use reference levels which are
recalculated over time, often built with data from the industry. Aspiration levels from the
behavioral theories of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963) also give support to changing
reference levels over time.  In the field of strategic management, the Strategic Reference
Point theory (Fiegenbaum, Hart and Schendel, 1996) highlights the importance of time in
defining reference levels.  Therefore, the following conceptual, but not mathematical,
property is proposed:
Property 8:  Reference levels change over time.
The former eight properties describe the axiomatic properties for which we contend that any
measure of performance should comply.  The properties are intended to make the measure
managerially and theoretically sound.  Although some of the properties can be similarly
found in literature, their joint consideration is not found, as far as we know.  The set of
properties applied to the SPM proposed in Definition 3 leads to the formulation of the
following proposition:
Proposition: The Strategic Performance Measure (SPM) complies with properties P1
to P8, as its constituent measures comply with their corresponding properties:
1. The measure of Static Performance, iSP , complies with all properties that apply to
it (P1, P2, P3, P4, P7, P8).
2. The measure of Dynamic Performance, iDP , complies with all properties that apply
to it  (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8).
See Appendix 1 for proof of the Proposition.
Compliance with the axiomatic properties proves that the SPM conveys the type of strategic
performance evaluation defended in this paper, allowing SPM to be considered conceptually
valid.  The importance of this compliance depends, in turn, on the validity of the objective
posed for firms: the search for sustainable superior performance.  The prevalence of this
objective maybe subject to discussion, but it is necessarily important either descriptively,
normatively, or under both points of view.
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5. Measuring Sustained Superior Performance in the Spanish Banking Sector
To illustrate the measures proposed and their properties, this paper presents an application to
the Spanish banking sector, which analyzes the performance of firms competing in the
industry from 1987 to 1999.   The Spanish banking sector is adequate for the application of
the strategic performance evaluation because it is a sector with increasing competition, where
strategic competition undoubtedly applies, especially for the biggest banks and savings
banks, and for the innovative or differentiated medium banks.  With this application, we shall
show that static performance describes the degree of achievement of superior performance for
a banking firm during a time-period, and dynamic performance captures the time trend of
superior performance, which is its observed sustainability over time.
The period under analysis is characterized by containing the final part of a long deregulation
phase that had the objective to progressively comply with the Second Banking Directive of
the European Union, which aimed at preparing the unified banking market in 1993.11  This
liberalization implied an increase in the competitive possibilities for the banks, and a bigger
one for the savings banks as they were previously affected by more restrictions.  One of the
main reactions to the new environment was the mergers wave, which significantly reduced
the number of banking firms in the sector and, therefore, increased its dimension.  Its peak
period was in 1990, and it ended in 1995.  After the consolidation wave, the leading role for
strategic moves was mainly given to the slight post-merger rationalizations, stronger price
competition, and branch expansion.  Because of the structural and competitive changes, it is
interesting to analyze the period under study in three parts: 1988-1991, 1992-1995, and 1996-
1999.12  The first subperiod corresponds to the last steps in deregulation. The second would
contain the first reactions to the new deregulated competitive framework, including the
consolidation wave. The last period corresponds to a more stable post-regulatory phase.
These subperiods contain 4 years each, therefore, the Static Performance will be based on
these 4 years, and the Dynamic Performance on the corresponding 4 transitions in
performance.
According to the competitive situation, we would expect to find that Sustained Superior
Performance (State 1) is an exceptional situation, as the increased competition erodes the
previous privileged positions, situating the performance of the firm in Eroding Superior
Performance (State 2) or even in the inferior performance states, in the case of more
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hypercompetition.  Theory would also predict that enlarged competitive possibilities would
promote competitive moves, innovation, and more dynamism in the sector increasing the
probabilities of transitions between performance states: from superior performance (States 1
and 2) to inferior performance (States 3 and 4), and conversely when some banks are able to
build competitive advantages.
The application uses the operating returns on assets as the relevant performance variable
because it reflects the effect of strategies in the financial intermediation business, which is the
traditional activity of banks.  The SPM is computed using the operating returns´ sample mean
as the reference level.  The firm-level data is obtained from annual bank account records
published by the Spanish Banking Association (AEB) and the Spanish Savings Banks
Confederation (CECA).  As a panel of results was preferable for the purpose of this
application, we have reconstructed the returns of the merged firms in the years previous to the
merger.  The sample includes the banks which had a complete panel of data for the period
and which did not present abnormal data in their annual accounts.13 This has led to a final
sample of 50 savings banks and 37 banks.
The results of computing the SPM for the sample show that Sustained Superior Performance
(State 1) exists for some firms in every subperiod, but it is difficult to maintain.  Actually,
there is only one firm which keeps its SPM in State 1 for the three subperiods.  This firm is
labelled SB1 and it is a savings bank with a regional focus.  The value of its sustained
superior performance can be observed in table 1, which also presents the results of eight more
banking firms that will be used as examples.  The SPM of the firm is depicted in figure 3. It
has achieved a superior performance because SP is positive in every subperiod, being around
0.5.  This figure indicates that its performance has been approximately 0.5 points over the
industry average. As regards to DP, it shows that its performance presented an increasing
trend because DP is positive.  Particularly, it increased at a rate of 0.142 in the first
subperiod, but only at rate of 0.015 in the third one.  In the same Figure there are two more
examples of firms which keep their state during the three subperiods.   B1 is a large bank
with a national focus.14 Its SPM indicates that it has an Eroding Superior Performance (State
2).  The temporal dynamics of SPM for B1 indicates that its superior performance (SP) has
decreased over the three subperiods.  The third bank represented in Figure 3 is B2, which is a
small national bank specialized in commercial banking.  Its SPM is Worsening Inferior
Performance for the three subperiods.  The inferior performance (SP) ranges from 0.591 in
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the first subperiod to 1.628 in the last subperiod.  The yearly rate of performance
deterioration is 0.361 in the first subperiod, but reduces in the following ones, approaching
zero.  We must note that B2 is the only firm in the sector staying permanently in State 3.  As
for State 2, apart from B1, there is only one other case.
-- Insert Table 1 around here --
-- Insert Figure 3 around here --
In Figure 4 three more cases are depicted where the transitions from one state to another can
be observed.  B3 is a large national bank which enjoys superior performance during the three
subperiods, but which suffers an erosion of its initial sustained superior advantage.  Therefore
it moves from State 1 to State 2, and it stays in State 2 for the third subperiod.  Its superior
performance (SP) is remarkable – it is one of the best performing firms in the sector – and it
ranges from 2.061 in the first subperiod to 1.57 in the last one.  The yearly rate of erosion of
its superior performance (DP) is 0.077 and 0.145 in the second and third subperiods,
respectively, indicating a persistent erosion of performance.  In the same Figure B4 is
depicted, which is a small bank with a regional focus.  Its SPM indicates that this firm has
been unsuccessful in its performance during the last two subperiods.  In particular it starts
with a Sustained Superior Performance (State 1) during the first subperiod, but then continues
with an Eroding Superior Performance (State 2), and ends with Worsening Inferior
Performance (State 3).  In contrast, an improving trajectory is observed for SB2, which is a
large savings bank with a national focus.  Its SPM starts in Worsening Inferior Performance
(State 3) and moves to Sustained Superior Performance (State 1) in the second subperiod, to
stay there in the third one.  It would be interesting to know what strategies have allowed this
firm to move from the worst state to the best one.
-- Insert Figure 4 around here --
Three more cases are presented in Figure 5. All three firms are large savings banks that had a
regional focus before the deregulation and which have made a great branching expansion to
become players at the national level.  SB3 is an example of step-by-step improvement, and its
SPM has moved from State 3 to 4 and, finally, to State 1.  SB4 is an example of a yo-yo
behavior, as its performance started in State 3, improved to State 4, and ended back in State
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3.  The last one, SB5,  had a worsening performance which improved dynamically in the last
subperiod.  Particularly, its SPM moved from State 2 to State 3, but initiated a recovery in the
last subperiod because the inferior performance was reduced (State 4).
-- Insert Figure 5 around here --
6. Conclusions
This paper has addressed the measurement of strategic performance by building on three
pillars: (i) the generic objective for firms of pursuing sustainable superior performance, (ii)
received strategic management literature, and (iii) existing empirical literature on the
persistence of profits and literature on ex post performance.  Three basic conceptual
properties are derived from the generic objective of pursuing sustainable competitive
advantage: relativity, sign dependence, and dynamism.  According to these properties, the
two-dimensional Strategic Performance Measure (SPM) is defined, composed of a measure
of Static Performance and a measure of Dynamic Performance.  The SPM provides the
measurement of the sustained superior performance attained.  Otherwise, it identifies three
more possible states of performance: eroding superior performance, improving inferior
performance, and worsening inferior performance.  The SPM provides a cardinal
measurement of performance at the firm level, which enlarges the vision offered by the
literature on the persistence of profits found in industrial organization literature and in the
field of strategic management.  Literature on ex post risk (performance) does provide cardinal
measurements at the firm level, but its valuations do not correspond to the objective of
pursuing sustainable superior performance, and it is has rarely focused on capturing the
temporal dynamics of performance.
The paper has explored the graphic analysis of SPM, which permits the analysis of changes in
performance states over time.  This analysis provides a visual aid to understanding the
performance effects of the strategic interaction among firms, because the performance of
relevant competitors can be analyzed in parallel.  It has been illustrated in an application to
some cases of strategic competition in the Spanish banking sector.
Two broad possibilities for extension are worth mentioning.  Firstly, SPM could be used to
test hypotheses brought by literature, as it is applicable to different empirical contexts by
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defining the adequate performance variable.  For example, to test the degree to which
superior performance is persistent for firms pursuing different strategies, or whether a certain
performance trajectory backed by theory stands or not.  The deterministic approach and linear
definition of the functions that consider the variables influencing performance (value of
outcomes, frequency) grant the separability of SPM into additive parts.  The exploration of
this possibility may contribute an interesting methodology to explain the nature of superior
performance and of its sustainability.
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Appendix 1  Proof of the proposition
Property 1 Relativity in value.
1a. ( ) 1
1
∑
=
−=
n
t
ref
titi xxn
SP , therefore it is a function of ix  and 
refx .
1b. ( )∑
=
−−−=
n
t
ititi n
DP
2
11
1 δδ , thus, it is a function of itδ , which, in turn, is a function of ix
and refx .
Property 2 Sign dependence.
2a. A good static outcome complies with 0'>δ and has a frequency of 
n
1 .  If it is added to
the existing δ series, ceteris paribus, which has a certain static evaluation measured by
( )δSP , then, ( ) ( ) δδδδδδ ′+=′+=+ ∑
= n
SP
nn
SP
n
t
it
111'
1
.  As 0'>δ , then ( ) ( )δδδ SPSP >+ ' .
2b. Similarly to 2a, for SP, if δ ′ is a bad static outcome, then 0<′δ , thus, ( ) ( )δδδ SPSP <+ ' .
2c. For DP, if z′ is a good dynamic outcome, 0'>z , and if it is added to the existing z series,
ceteris paribus,  11
1
z
n
z
n
DP
n
t
iti ′+= ∑
=
, that is, ( ) ( ) )('.' zqzzDPzzDP +=+ .  As 0'>z , then
( ) ( )zDPzzDP >+ ' .
2d. Similarly to 2c, for DP, if z′  is a bad static outcome, then 0<′z , therefore
( ) ( )zDPzzDP <+ ' .
For the monotonicity properties we can express SP and DP in a more general expression,
separating good from bad outcomes and considering the frequency of each of the outcomes,
as follows:
( ) )()(
00
δδδδδ
δδ
ppSP
itit
∑∑
≤>
⋅−⋅= ,
( ) ( )∑∑
<≥
⋅−⋅=
00 itit zz
i zqzzqzDP .
Property 3 Monotonicity in value.
3a. For SP, if 0>δ , 0)(/ >=∂∂ δδ pSP .
3b. For SP, if 0≤δ , 0)(/ <−=∂∂ δδ pSP .
3c. For DP, if 0≥z , 0)(/ >=∂∂ zqzDP .
3d. For DP, if 0<z , 0)(/ <−=∂∂ zqzDP .
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Property 4 Monotonicity in frequency.
4a. For SP, if  p is the frequency of a certain good static outcome, then 0/ >=∂∂ δpSP .
4b. For SP, if  p is the frequency of a certain bad static outcome, then 0/ <−=∂∂ δpSP .
4c. For DP, if q is the frequency of a certain good dynamic outcome, then 0/ >=∂∂ zqDP .
4d. For DP, if q is the frequency of a certain bad dynamic outcome, then 0/ <−=∂∂ zqDP .
The expression of the measure of Dynamic Performance can be rewritten in terms of the
increments of outcomes for the firm under evaluation, 1−−=∆ tititi xxx , and for the reference
levels reft
ref
t
ref
t xxx 1−−=∆ , leaving the expression of iDP  as follows:( ) ( ) ( )∑∑
<∆−∆≥∆−∆
⋅∆−∆−⋅∆−∆=
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ref
tti xx
ref
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ref
titi zqxxzqxxDP .
Otherwise, it can be written as:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∑∑
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Property 5 Dynamic sign dependence.
5a. For a good dynamic outcome, that is, when 0≥∆−∆= reftitit xxz , then
0)(/ >=∆∂∂ zqxDP it .
5b. For a bad dynamic outcome, that is, when 0<∆−∆= reftitit xxz , then 0)(/ >=∆∂∂ zqxDP it .
Property 6 Dynamic relativity.
6a. For a good dynamic outcome, that is, when 0≥∆−∆= reftitit xxz , then
0)(/ <−=∆∂∂ zqxDP reft .
6b. For a bad dynamic outcome, that is, when 0<∆−∆= reftitit xxz , then
0)(/ <−=∆∂∂ zqxDP reft .
Property 7  Non-increasing sensitivity in the value of outcomes.
7a. For SP, 0/ 22 =∂∂ δSP because SP is linear on δ .
7b. For DP, 0/ 22 =∂∂ zDP because DP is linear on z.
Property 8  Reference levels change over time.
8a. For SP, as ( ) reftitit xx −=δ , reference levels are introduced by  reftx which are defined to
vary over time.
8b. For DP, as ( ) 1−−= itititz δδ , dynamic reference levels are variable over time as they are
set as the previous period deviation.  In turn, static reference levels are introduced by
 reftx which are defined to vary over time.
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Figure. 1 Four states in strategic performance evaluation
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SPM SPM SPM
1988-1991 1992-1995 1996-1999
SP DP SP DP SP DP
SB1 0.483% 0.142% 0.588% 0.024% 0.443% 0.015%
B1 1.171% -0.092% 0.505% -0.129% 0.148% -0.031%
B2 -0.591% -0.361% -1.401% -0.102% -1.628% -0.005%
B3 2.061% 0.194% 2.013% -0.077% 1.570% -0.145%
B4 2.099% 0.711% 1.011% -0.601% -0.252% -0.261%
SB2 -0.670% -0.220% 0.150% 0.273% 0.351% 0.039%
SB3 -0.646% -0.262% -0.251% 0.331% 0.489% 0.080%
SB4 -0.702% -0.074% -0.478% 0.094% -0.496% -0.041%
SB5 0.899% -0.153% -0.069% -0.231% -0.291% 0.079%
Table. 1 Strategic Performance Measure results for the example firms
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Strategic Performance Measure: Examples I
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Figure 3. Strategic Performance Measure: Examples I
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Strategic Performance Measure: Examples II
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Figure 4. Strategic Performance Measure: Examples II
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Strategic Performance Measure: Examples III
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Figure 5. Strategic Performance Measure: Examples III
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Footnotes
1 In ex post risk literature there have also been some time-series approaches (e.g., Bettis and Mahajan, 1990),
but the majority of the works have been measure-oriented.
2 The definition of Besanko, Dranove and Shanley (1996) actually refers to competitive advantage, which they
assimilate to superior performance as it is the expected cause-effect relationship.
3 See references in section 2.
4 The reference, or target level, is considered to be only dependent on time, in the sense that it is common for all
firms belonging to the system under analysis, as the evaluation takes place in a context of strategic competition.
5 Should the outcomes be continuous, the expression for the static performance measure would be
 ∫= dpSP iti δ , where p is the density function of outcomes.
6 The aggregation of the static performance, itδ , is carried out linearly to comply with sign dependence.
Nevertheless, the aggregation could include the consideration of weights, which would leave its expression as:
( ) ∑
=
=
n
t
ititi wnSP
1
,1 δ .  This would allow the definition of weights variable over time or over values of itδ ,
reflecting varying preferences over time or values, respectively.  For the purpose of this article, the unweighted
aggregation is preferred as it assures a convenient information content of the measures proposed, and we find no
theoretical need to make a weighted aggregation.  Further, the unweighted proposal does not cause the analysis
any relevant loss of generality, because the inclusion of standard weights (positive) would not change the
axiomatic and theoretical analysis provided.
7 Should the oucomes be continuous,  ∫= dqzDP iti , where q is the density function of outcomes' transitions.
8 The aggregation of the dynamic performance, itz , is carried out linearly to comply with sign dependence.
Nevertheless, the aggregation could include the consideration of weights, which would leave its expression as:
( ) ∑
=
=
n
t
ititi zwnDP
1
,1 .  See footnote 6 for further comments.
9 This expression also shows the equivalence between first considering relativity and then dynamism, or the
reverse.
10  The signs of the inequalities have been defined to comply with the objective of sustained superior
performance, superior performance being identified with 0>iSP , and sustained or increasing performance
over time with 0≥iDP .
11 The main policies included were the complete deregulation of interest rates (1987); the end of the branch
expansion control (1985 for banks, 1989 for savings banks); the abolition of restrictions to the entrance of
foreign  banks (1988, 1993); and the removal of the liquidity requirements which implied compulsory
investment in government bonds (1992).
12 Note that the initial period (1987) is not included in the evaluation as there is one initial period needed to
compute the dynamic performance, z, of 1988.
13 The banks involved in mergers and acquisitions are not included in the sample because they do not have a
complete panel, but they are considered in the reconstructed return series for the bank resulting from the
consolidation.  Abnormal observations were the ones that stated null assets or workers during the period under
analysis, indicating that the bank was operating in special situations, such as whether it was temporarily
inoperative, being restructured or operating in other activities but not in the traditional banking intermediation.
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14 Large banks and savings banks are those belonging to the top ten in average assets during the period under
analysis.
